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INTRODUCTION 
Between 1999 and 2013, more than 18,400 infants were successfully 
delivered via gestational surrogacy in the United States.1  Gestational 
surrogacy, or a surrogacy agreement in which all of the genetic material 
originates from people other than the surrogate, is becoming increasingly 
popular.2  Commercial surrogacy is a gestational surrogacy arrangement in 
which the surrogate is paid a fee beyond compensation for medical bills 
during their pregnancy.3  Altruistic surrogacy, or surrogacy in which the 
surrogate is not paid a fee beyond compensation for medical bills, is also 
used in the United States.4  As technology improves, so does the number of 
infants born to surrogates; 3,432 were born in 2013 compared to just 727 in 
1999.5  There is no federal surrogacy regulation in the United States, and 
 
 1. See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, KEY FINDINGS: USE OF 
GESTATIONAL CARRIERS IN THE UNITED STATES (2019), https://www.cdc.gov/art/key-
findings/gestational-carriers.html (indicating substantial growth over the last two 
decades in surrogacy births as gestational science improves) [hereinafter Key Findings]). 
 2. See ALEX FINKELSTEIN ET AL., SURROGACY LAW AND POLICY IN THE U.S.: A 
NATIONAL CONVERSATION INFORMED BY GLOBAL LAWMAKING, COLUM. L. SCH. 
SEXUALITY & GENDER L. CLINIC 5 (2016) (distinguishing between “traditional” 
surrogacy, where the surrogate is a biological parent, and “gestational” surrogacy, where 
a surrogate carries other people’s genetic material). 
 3. See id. at 3, 5 (arguing that LGBTQ+ persons’ parenting desires need to be 
balanced with surrogates’ rights). 
 4. See id. at 4-5 (analyzing the proposed New York statute that would allow 
commercial surrogacy). 
 5. See KEY FINDINGS, supra note 1 (acknowledging the recent increase of 
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states vary on whether surrogacy contracts are legal.6  There is a broad 
spectrum of surrogacy regulations across states; though the vast majority of 
states allow commercial surrogacy, many regulate who may engage in 
surrogacy and under what conditions, while two states ban it completely.7 
Florida and Illinois, generally considered “surrogate-friendly” states, have 
statutes that only allow commercial surrogacy in cases where the intended 
parent cannot carry the child to term for medical reasons.8  Section 742.15 in 
Florida’s statute (hereafter “Florida statute”) is gendered, specifying that the 
intended mother must have some medical need to use a surrogate.9  Illinois 
Statute 47/20 (hereinafter “Illinois statute”) is gender-neutral but still 
requires the parent to have a medical need for a commercial surrogacy 
contract to be enforceable.10  By enforcing a medical need requirement, these 
state statutes unconstitutionally infringe upon an individual’s right to 
procreate.11  In the wake of Skinner v. Oklahoma (hereinafter Skinner) and 
Obergefell v. Hodges (hereinafter Obergefell), it is unconstitutional for state 
surrogacy statutes to deny persons the right to procreate based on a lack of 
medical need because it effectively restricts the right of LGBTQ+ people, 
whether single or as a couple, to procreate.12 
This Comment will argue that gender-specific statutes unconstitutionally 
limit the right to procreate for non-female people and same-sex couples.13  
 
surrogates used for assisted reproduction). 
 6. See Intended Parents Surrogacy Laws by State, SURROGATE.COM, 
https://surrogate.com/intended-parents/surrogacy-laws-and-legal-information/ 
surrogacy-laws-by-state/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2019) (emphasizing that the lack of 
federal regulation makes surrogacy law confusing). 
 7. See id. (distinguishing between states that are “surrogacy friendly,” from those 
that are not). 
 8. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/20 (2017) (stating in gender-inclusive terms that a 
medical need is required for a valid surrogate contract); see also FLA. STAT. § 742.15 
(1993) (stating in gender-specific terms that the intended mother must have a medical 
need for a valid surrogate contract). 
 9. See FLA. STAT. § 742.15 (emphasizing that a “commissioning mother” must not 
be able to carry the pregnancy to term because the gestation will harm her health). 
 10. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/20 (2017) (requiring an intended parent – “he, she, 
or they” – to have a physician’s affidavit). 
 11. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015) (enforcing the right to 
marry and all enshrined rights for same-sex couples); see also Skinner v. Oklahoma ex 
rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 538 (1942) (incorporating the right to procreate under the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
 12. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599 (holding that same-sex couples are entitled to 
right to marriage and its benefits); see also Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (holding that any 
limit on the right to procreate must undergo strict scrutiny). 
 13. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 536 (explaining that the right to procreation is 
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Part I provides an overview of the variations in surrogacy law across the 
United States and a brief history of surrogacy contract litigation.14  Part I also 
provides an overview of Supreme Court cases that speak to the various 
fundamental rights attributed to marriage and the right to procreate.15  Part II 
argues that under Skinner, both the Florida and Illinois statutes are 
unconstitutional because they limit the right to procreate for LBGTQ+ 
people.16  Part II further argues that the right of LGBTQ+ people to procreate 
via a surrogacy contract was reaffirmed under Obergefell as a right 
encompassed in the fundamental right to marry.17  As such, the Florida and 
Illinois statutes are unconstitutional under Obergefell because they limit this 
right which is guaranteed to all married couples, no matter their gender.18  
Part II will also discuss In re Gestational Agreement, where the Supreme 
Court of Utah in August 2019 reaffirmed the United States Supreme Court’s 
Obergefell rulings, thus showing the movement of the states toward inclusive 
surrogacy law.19  Part III will conclude that the Florida and Illinois statutes 
are unconstitutional under Skinner and Obergefell.20 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Variations in U.S. Surrogacy Law 
As reproductive science improves, surrogacy grows in popularity in the 
 
fundamental to the survival of the human race). 
 14. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2597 (recognizing the differences imposed on 
LGBTQ+ people when laws deny same-sex marriage). 
 15. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599 (ensuring the right to marry for all people 
regardless of sexual orientation); see also Carey v. Population Servs., Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 
684-85 (1977) (protecting the right of autonomous childbearing decisions), Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (combining parts of the Bill of Rights in a 
penumbral right to privacy in intimate relations). 
 16. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (mandating that the right to procreate is a 
fundamental right that requires strict scrutiny). 
 17. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2585 (emphasizing that the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses together protect the liberty interest found in the right to marry for all 
people). 
 18. See id. at 2599 (arguing that the right to marry is fundamental because it includes 
other fundamental rights such as the right to procreate and make autonomous decisions 
in childrearing). 
 19. See In re Gestational Agreement, 2019 UT 40, 449 P.3d 69, 78, 80, 84 (Utah 
2019) (overturning a Utah statute with a gendered medical need requirement). 
 20. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599 (ruling that the right to marry includes the 
right to procreate and applies to same-sex couples and different-sex couples equally); see 
also Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (stating the importance of strict scrutiny of procreation-
limiting laws to ensure there is no discrimination). 
4
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United States.21  Surrogacy is especially appealing to LGBTQ+ people and 
couples, who make up about 4.5 percent of the United States population.22  
The United States is growing in popularity as a destination for surrogacy 
tourism as well, a phenomenon in which an infertile person or couple forms 
a contract with a surrogate in another country to carry a child to term.23  Other 
popular destinations for surrogacy, like India and Nepal, have recently 
banned commercial surrogacy, leaving few options for those in need of a 
surrogate.24  These bans frequently lead people to contract with a surrogate 
on the black market.25  The United States offers a legal alternative for 
international surrogate-seekers.26 
Despite the growing popularity, the legal surrogacy landscape in the 
United States is varied; there is no one uniform federal regulatory structure 
and each state’s regulations differ.27  Commercial surrogacy, the practice in 
 
 21. See KEY FINDINGS, supra note 1 (noting the significant increase in births via 
gestational surrogacy over the last two decades). 
 22. See LGBT DEMOGRAPHIC DATA INTERACTIVE, THE WILLIAMS INSTITUTE, UCLA 
SCHOOL OF LAW (2019), https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/visualization/ lgbt-
stats/?topic=LGBT#density (showing that on average, members of the LGBTQ+ 
community make up only 4.5 percent of state populations with D.C. as an outlier at 9.8 
percent); see also Surrogate, About Surrogacy: Gay Surrogacy – Surrogacy for LGBT 
Couples, https://surrogate.com/about-surrogacy/types-of-surrogacy/can-lgbt-couples-
pursue-surrogacy/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2020) (explaining that surrogacy provides 
LGBTQ+ people with the ability to have biological children). 
 23. Tamar Lewin, Coming to U.S. for Baby, and Womb to Carry It, N.Y. TIMES, July 
6, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/06/us/foreign-couples-heading-to-america-
for-surrogate-pregnancies.html (describing the influx of surrogacy tourism into the 
United States). 
 24. See Nepal Joins India and Thailand in Commercial Surrogacy Ban, CONCEIVE 
ABILITIES (June 17, 2016), https://www.conceiveabilities.com/about/blog/nepal-joins-
india-and-thailand-in-commercial-surrogacy-ban (discussing recent bans on commercial 
surrogacy in the international community). 
 25. See Ian Johnson & Cao Li, China Experiences a Booming Underground Market 
in Surrogate Motherhood, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2014, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/03/world/asia/china-experiences-a-booming-black-
market-in-child-surrogacy.html (uncovering the surrogacy black market in China, where 
embryos are implanted in a surrogacy-friendly country). 
 26. See Tamar Lewin, Coming to U.S. for Baby, and Womb to Carry It, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 5, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/06/us/foreign-couples-heading-to-
america-for-surrogate-pregnancies.html (explaining that some parents wish the child to 
have citizenship from their country of origin, while some wish their child to be born in 
the U.S. and receive American citizenship). 
 27. See Gestational Surrogacy Law Across the United States, CREATIVE FAMILY 
CONNECTIONS (2016), https://www.creativefamilyconnections.com/us-surrogacy-law-
map/ (alerting potential commissioning parents to the various pitfalls in each state and 
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which the surrogate is paid a fee beyond compensation for medical bills, is 
widely debated amongst the states.28  All states allow altruistic surrogacy, or 
surrogacy in which the surrogate mother is not paid a fee beyond 
compensation for medical bills, but differ on the limits and requirements for 
engaging a surrogate.29  For clarity, gestational surrogacy and traditional 
surrogacy are distinct, and both can be commercial or altruistic agreements.30  
Gestational surrogates carry a fetus created from the egg of a donor or a 
contracting person.31  A traditional surrogate provides the egg. Both 
gestational and traditional surrogates carry a fetus that is not their biological 
child.32 
As surrogacy becomes commonplace, state regulations are evolving as 
well.33  For example, In re Baby M, decided in 1988, instigated the first major 
wave of regulatory court cases and legislation across the country.34  The case 
involved a traditional surrogate breaking her surrogacy contract, arguing that 
she had a constitutional right to contact her biological child.35  The court 
ruled that commercial surrogacy contracts, or exchanging money for 
surrogacy beyond medical expenses, were void as a matter of law and against 
public policy.36 
 
urging them to obtain legal representation when engaging in a surrogacy agreement). 
 28. See Alex Finkelstein, supra note 2, at 5 (noting that the line between “reasonable 
expenses” and “payment for services” is constantly being redrawn by courts). 
 29. See id. (explaining that altruistic surrogacy is sometimes referred to as 
“uncompensated surrogacy” and commercial surrogacy as “compensated surrogacy”). 
 30. See id. (noting that gestational surrogacy, or “full surrogacy,” requires the 
assisted reproductive technology). 
 31. See id. (clarifying that traditional surrogacy, or “partial surrogacy,” is an 
arrangement in which the surrogate provides the genetic material necessary to conceive 
the child). 
 32. See KEY FINDINGS, supra note 1 (noting that gestational carrier cycles were more 
likely to result in pregnancy and live births in comparison to non-gestational carrier 
cycles). 
 33. See Diane S. Hinson & Maureen McBrien, Surrogacy Across American, 32 
FAMILY ADVOCAT. 32, 34 (2011), https://creativefamilyconnections.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/05/SurrogacyAcrossAmerica.pdf?x20128 (separating states into 
“red light,” “proceed at your own risk,” “squeeze into the statutory box,” and “green 
light” groups). 
 34. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1240 (N.J. 1988) (holding surrogate contracts 
invalid as a matter of law and policy). 
 35. See id. (arguing that public policy mandates a child should receive nurturing 
from both natural parents). 
 36. See id. (assuming that the money exchanged was essentially for buying the child 
from the biological mother, not for contracting her services as a surrogate). 
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Arizona was the first state to ban surrogacy contracts as a matter of public 
policy following the decision.37  Michigan, New York, and the District of 
Columbia followed close behind.38  While states like New York enforce the 
ban on commercial surrogacy with a fine, D.C.’s 1993 ban made it a criminal 
offense punishable by imprisonment.39  In 2017, D.C. repealed the 1993 ban 
and replaced it with surrogacy-friendly legislation.40 
Unlike D.C. and Arizona, California’s Supreme Court ruled in favor of 
enforcing surrogacy contracts in Johnson v. Calvert.41  In 1993, the Calverts, 
a married cisgender, hetero-presenting couple, sued for the parental rights of 
their biological child after the contracted gestational surrogate tried to claim 
parental rights for herself.42  The California Supreme Court upheld the 
agreement in favor of the intended parents, using the parties’ intent at the 
time the contract was created as a basis for the decision.43 
Today, five states–New York, Michigan, Louisiana, Arizona, and 
Indiana–completely ban commercial surrogacy.44  The remaining forty-five 
states vary in what they allow, from states with no regulations whatsoever 
 
 37. See Hinson & McBrien, supra note 33, at 32 (showing the wave of anti-surrogacy 
legislation that swept the country post-Baby M). 
 38. See id. (explaining that Michigan and D.C. criminalized commercial surrogacy). 
 39. See id. at 34 (explaining that D.C. was the only jurisdiction with no surrogacy 
because it was illegal for attorneys to assist). 
 40. See Michael Alison Chandler, With New Surrogacy Law, D.C. Joins 
Jurisdictions That Are Making It Easier for Gay and Infertile Couples to Start Families, 
WASH. POST (June 3, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/social-issues/with-
new-surrogacy-law-dc-joins-jurisdictions-that-are-making-it-easier-for-gay-and-
infertile-couples-to-start-families/2017/06/03/845c90d4-3c99-11e7-8854-
21f359183e8c_story.html (celebrating D.C.’s reversal of surrogacy criminalization). 
 41. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d, 776, 778 (Cal. 1993) (granting the intended 
parents sole custody because their intent when making the agreement was to become the 
parents of the child, while the surrogate’s intent was not). 
 42. See id. (stating that the surrogate, Anna, threatened to keep the child if the 
payment balance was not given to her); see also LGBTQ+ Definitions, Trans Student 
Educational Resources (2019), http://www.transstudent.org/definitions (defining 
“cisgender” as people that identify with their assigned gender and “presenting” as the 
physical manifestation of gender identity). 
 43. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 781-82 (reasoning that the historical common law 
approach equates gestation with genetic relationship, which is not always the case). 
 44. See Gestational Surrogacy Law Across the United States, Creative Family 
Connections (2016), https://www.creativefamilyconnections.com/us-surrogacy-law-
map/ (citing the states that still enforce laws making it illegal for surrogates to be paid 
beyond medical fees); but see Vivian Wang, Battle Over Paid Surrogacy in New York 
Pits Progressives Against Feminists, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2019 at A17 (recognizing the 
New York movement toward legalization of commercial surrogacy). 
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(like Oregon) to states that essentially require a trial before allowing a pre-
birth order.45  Most states with legislation pertaining specifically to 
gestational surrogacy contracts model their statutes from Article 8 of the 
Uniform Parentage Act (hereafter “Article 8”), an optional regulation for 
genetic and gestational surrogacy agreements.46  Article 8 lays out 
regulations for surrogacy agreements, requiring safeguards such as allowing 
traditional surrogates to withdraw consent within seventy-two hours of 
transferring the child, with the goal of protecting surrogates’ rights.47  Article 
8 has been through several iterations since its initial inception; most recently, 
the Uniform Law Commission revised the gendered 2002 version in 2017 to 
adopt gender-neutral phrasing and remove the marriage requirement.48 
Despite Article 8 and states’ movement toward legalizing commercial 
surrogacy, there is still uncertainty for many couples hoping for a surrogacy 
agreement.49  Florida and Illinois both allow commercial surrogacy, but are 
key examples of states with statutes that create uncertainty for LGBTQ+ 
couples seeking a commercial surrogacy agreement.50 
Florida’s statute is distinguishable from the Illinois statute as it is facially 
gender-specific; Illinois’s statute is facially gender-neutral.51  In Florida, the 
statute requires: 
(a) The commissioning mother cannot physically gestate a pregnancy to 
 
 45. See generally Mary P. Byrn & Steven H. Snyder, The Use of Prebirth Parentage 
Orders in Surrogacy Proceedings, 39 FAM. L. Q. 633, 634 (Fall 2005) (defining “pre-
birth orders” as parentage orders that formally declare that the intended parents will be 
the legal parents of the child upon its birth). 
 46. See Uniform Parentage Act, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, Art. 8 (2017) 
(providing states with a framework for regulating surrogacy in their own statutes). 
 47. See id. § 814(a)(2) (2017) (allowing a seventy-two-hour window after birth for 
a surrogate to withdraw consent without liability). 
 48. See Uniform Parentage Act, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, Art. 8 § 801(b) (2002) 
(requiring that “the man and the woman” who are the intended parents both be parties to 
the gestational agreement); see generally Amendments to the Uniform Parentage Act as 
Last Amended in 2002 With Prefatory Note and Comments, 37 FAM. L. Q. 5, 30 
(requiring marriage to engage a surrogate). 
 49. See Gestational Surrogacy Law Across the United States, CREATIVE FAMILY 
CONNECTIONS (2016), https://www.creativefamilyconnections.com/us-surrogacy-law-
map/ (noting that how surrogacy laws are written is not always how they are practiced). 
 50. See FLA. STAT. § 742.15 (1993) (allowing commercial surrogacy on its face but 
restricting LGBTQ+ people from surrogacy via statutory phrasing); see also 750 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 47/20 (2017) (allowing commercial surrogacy through gender-neutral 
phrasing but requiring a medical need requirement). 
 51. See FLA. STAT. § 742.15(2)(a)-(b) (1993) (using the gendered term “mother” for 
surrogacy requirements); see also 750ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/20 (2017) (using “he, she, or 
they” for nongendered surrogacy requirements). 
8
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term;  
(b) the gestation will cause a risk to the physical health of the 
commissioning mother; or  
(c) the gestation will cause a risk to the health of the fetus.52 
The Florida statute specifies “mother” as the individual required to have a 
medical need for a surrogate.53  This gendered term limits surrogacy 
contracts to cisgender, hetero-presenting couples because it does not include 
men.54  Although the phrase “cannot physically gestate a pregnancy to term” 
could be construed to include men, the term “mother” expressly excludes 
them from surrogacy contracts.55 
In contrast, the Illinois statute requires: 
(b) The intended parent or parents shall be deemed to have satisfied the 
requirements of this Act if he, she, or they have met the following 
requirements at the time the gestational surrogacy contract is executed:  
(1) he, she, or they contribute at least one of the gametes resulting in a pre-
embryo that the gestational surrogate will attempt to carry to term; 
(2) he, she, or they have a medical need for the gestational surrogacy 
evidenced by a qualified physicians affidavit attached to the gestational 
surrogacy contract and as required by the Illinois Parentage Act of 2015.56 
Illinois uses the gender-inclusive phrasing “he, she, or they” to refer to the 
commissioning parent or parents.57  The statute does not expressly define 
“medical need,” leaving it instead to medical practitioners to determine 
whether the threshold is met.58  Both statutes similarly place a limit on who 
is able to engage in a commercial surrogacy contract, regardless of the 
gender pronouns used.59 
 
 52. See FLA. STAT. § 742.15(2)(a)-(c) (1993) (specifying that the commissioning 
“mother” must have a medical need in order to legally enter into a surrogacy contract). 
 53. See FLA. STAT. § 742.15(2)(a)-(b) (phrasing the requirement with gendered 
pronouns in a way that restricts access to surrogacy contracts to hetero-presenting 
couples). 
 54. See FLA. STAT. § 742.15(2)(a)-(c) (excluding all people who are not 
“commissioning mothers” with a medical need as defined in the statute from engaging 
in a surrogacy agreement). 
 55. See FLA. STAT. § 742.15(2)(a)-(b) (restricting men or male-identifying people 
from engaging a surrogate by explicitly using the gendered term “mother”). 
 56. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/20 (2017) (using gender-neutral terms that would 
allow men and same-sex couples to be parties in a surrogacy contract). 
 57. See id. (requiring a “medical need” without defining what can fulfill that 
requirement, i.e. the inability to physically gestate a pregnancy). 
 58. See Nancy Ford, The New Illinois Gestational Surrogacy Act, 93 ILL. B.J. 240, 
245 (2005) (explaining that no state included cisgender men’s inability to become 
pregnant in the definition for the medical need required by statute). 
 59. See generally COURTNEY G. JOSLIN ET AL., STATUTORY PROVISIONS REGARDING 
9
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B. Constitutional Cases for Surrogacy 
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees 
the right to due process and equal protection under the law.60  The 
government may not strip a person of life, liberty, or property without due 
process of the law, and all people must be protected equally.61  The Supreme 
Court has incorporated the Fourteenth Amendment to protect many other 
rights, including the right to procreate and the right to marriage.62  Further, 
strict scrutiny is required for any law that may infringe upon a fundamental 
right.63  To meet the high standard for strict scrutiny, a statute must be 
narrowly tailored and support a compelling government interest.64 
Skinner v. Oklahoma was the first case to discuss the constitutionality of 
statutes regulating the right to procreate generally.65  In Skinner, the Court 
scrutinized an Oklahoma statute that allowed the state to perform 
vasectomies on defendants convicted of two or more felonies involving 
moral turpitude.66  The Supreme Court ruled that there was a constitutional 
right to procreate, adding it to the list of fundamental rights requiring the 
judiciary to apply strict scrutiny.67  The Court held that the statute violated 
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.68  Skinner also 
mandated that strict scrutiny is required for any law that may infringe upon 
 
THE PERMISSIBILITY AND ENFORCEABILITY OF SURROGACY AGREEMENTS, LESBIAN, GAY, 
BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER FAMILY LAW § 4:2 (2019) (listing statutes of the various 
states regarding surrogacy). 
 60. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (prohibiting states from making laws that limit 
life, liberty, or property). 
 61. See id. (precluding states from enacting laws that affect people unequally). 
 62. See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 538, 538-43 (1942) 
(incorporating the right to procreate via the Fourteenth Amendment so that it cannot be 
taken without due process of the law). 
 63. See D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 687(2008) (J. Breyer, dissenting) (outlining the 
requirements of strict scrutiny when ruling on cases involving fundamental rights). 
 64. See id. at 688 (dissenting to the proposal that strict scrutiny should be used for 
gun regulation cases). 
 65. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 538-43 (ruling the right to procreate to be a fundamental 
right that requires strict scrutiny when regulated by state laws). 
 66. See id. (explaining that “moral turpitude” here was a felony involving robbery 
but that “moral turpitude” essentially applies to all felonies, even someone who steals 
twenty-dollars from a stranger). 
 67. See id. at 540 (holding that strict scrutiny is required to restrict the power of evil 
or reckless people). 
 68. See id. at 538 (infringing on the fundamental right of procreation also infringes 
on the right to marriage). 
10
American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol28/iss3/3
2020] A WELL-ROUNDED ARGUMENT 451 
 
the fundamental right to procreate.69 
In a recent case, In re Gestational Agreement, Utah’s Supreme Court dug 
deeper into the right to procreate by overturning the state’s gestational 
agreement statute.70  The Court found the gendered medical need 
requirement of the statute unconstitutional.71  In re Gestational Agreement 
was a joint petition brought by a married same-sex couple along with the 
couple’s surrogate and her husband, requesting that the court validate their 
gestational agreement.72  On appeal, Utah’s Supreme Court reversed the 
lower court’s decision.73  The Court reasoned that under Obergefell, the 
gendered Utah statute unconstitutionally limited valid gestational surrogacy 
contracts to cisgender couples.74  By specifying that the intended mother 
must have a medical need for a surrogacy contract, the gendered statute 
effectively barred same-sex male-identifying couples from exercising their 
marital right to have children.75 
Obergefell holds that same-sex couples have a constitutional right to the 
“[c]onstellation of benefits that the States have linked to marriage.”76  Justice 
Kennedy includes contraception, childrearing, and procreation in a list of the 
“most intimate” choices included in the right to marry.77  The right to make 
these decisions, in addition to choosing to enter into marriage, are part of the 
Constitution through the Fourteenth Amendment.78  Under the Due Process 
 
 69. See id. (holding that strict scrutiny is required when looking at the infringement 
of a fundamental right); see also D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 688 (2008) (J. Breyer, 
dissenting) (outlining the requirements of strict scrutiny when ruling on cases involving 
fundamental rights). 
 70. See In re Gestational Agreement, 449 P.3d 69, 74 (Utah 2019) (overturning the 
Utah statute requiring the “intended mother” have a medical need). 
 71. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-803(2)(b) (West 2008) (defining “medical need” 
as an intended mother that is unable to bear a child without risk to her health or the 
child’s). 
 72. See In re Gestational Agreement, 449 P.3d 69 (Utah 2019) (explaining that there 
was standing for the court to hear the case despite it not being adversarial). 
 73. See id. at 80 (arguing that surrogacy and the right to have children are provided 
by the right to marriage). 
 74. See id. at 77 (holding that the Utah code conditions a valid gestational contract 
on the requirement that one parent be female). 
 75. See id. at 79 (reasoning that the Utah code violated Obergefell by depriving 
same-sex male couples the ability to be parties in valid gestational agreements). 
 76. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2590 (2015) (referring to the multiple 
rights that the Court connects to the right to marriage, including the right to procreate). 
 77. See id. at 2599 (concluding that same-sex couples have the right to make 
decisions regarding family life in addition to the right to marry). 
 78. See id. at 2607 (stating that the decision to marry and raise children is based on 
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, due process of law is required for a 
State to deprive a person of life, liberty, or property.79  Obergefell also held 
that the Equal Protection Clause secures the protection of the right to marry 
for all people, regardless of sexual orientation.80 Obergefell holds that 
through the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the right to marry is a fundamental right guaranteed to all 
people, and same-sex couples cannot be denied that right.81 
Most recently, the U.S. Supreme Court heard Pavan v. Smith, a 2017 case 
hinging on an Arkansas statute which mandated that a surrogate and her 
husband be listed as the mother and father on a child’s birth certificate.82  The 
suit was brought by two same-sex couples who conceived their children 
through sperm donation.83  Leigh Jacobs and Terrah Pavan each gave birth, 
but the statute barred their wives from being listed as a legal parent.84  The 
Supreme Court ruled the statute unconstitutional because it denied marital 
benefits to same-sex couples.85 
II.  ANALYSIS 
A. Medical Need Requirements Are Unconstitutional Under Skinner 
Because They Bar the Right to Procreate 
Florida and Illinois’ statutory requirement of “medical need” in order to 
engage in a valid surrogacy contract is unconstitutional and unenforceable 
 
romantic and personal considerations). 
 79. See id. at 2597 (naming the fundamental liberties – life, liberty, and property – 
protected by the Bill of Rights that cannot be taken by a State without due process of 
law). 
 80. See id. at 2591 (connecting the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause 
and Equal Protection Clause to show that together they fully capture the protection of the 
right to marry). 
 81. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602 (explaining that the right to marry is part of 
the liberty interest and equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
 82. See Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2077 (2017) (overturning the lower court 
judgment to deny legal parentage to the same-sex spouses of the biological mothers); see 
also ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-18-401(e)-(f)(1) (West 2014) (defining the terms “mother” 
and “father,” as the woman who gave birth and her husband). 
 83. See Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2077 (seeking a declaration that the Arkansas birth 
certificate law is unconstitutional). 
 84. See id. (denying legal parentage to same-sex couples because the legislature 
emphasized biological parentage in the statute). 
 85. See id. (holding the Arkansas statute unconstitutional because it denied same-sex 
couples the “constellation of benefits” Obergefell guaranteed to all marriages). 
12
American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol28/iss3/3
2020] A WELL-ROUNDED ARGUMENT 453 
 
under Supreme Court precedent because it broadly limits the right to 
procreate without a substantial government interest.86  Skinner supports the 
argument that it is unconstitutional to block the right to procreate through the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.87  The Fourteenth 
Amendment prohibits State laws from unequally infringing on people’s 
rights, such as the right to procreate.88  Surrogacy contracts, therefore, are 
preserved in the right to procreate established in Skinner’s holding.89 
1. The Florida Statutory Requirement That a Person Must Have a 
Medical Need to Before Entering into a Valid Surrogacy Contract Is 
Unconstitutional Under Skinner Because It Bars a Group of People from 
Their Right to Procreate. 
The fundamental idea behind the Skinner holding is that procreation is a 
basic human right.90  According to the Supreme Court, marriage and 
procreation are fundamental rights that speak to the basic existence and 
survival of our species.91  When surrogacy statutes, like Florida’s, limit the 
right to procreate via surrogacy solely to a medical need, the right to 
procreate is stripped from individuals that are physically healthy but are 
unable to bear children for other reasons.92 
Medical need requirements heavily affect same-sex couples and other 
members of the LGBTQ+ community who were historically, and are 
currently, plagued with legal issues surrounding the parentage and custody 
 
 86. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15 (West 1993) (requiring that a commissioning 
mother medically cannot carry a fetus or doing so would risk her physical health); see 
also 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/20 (2017) (requiring the intended parents have a medical 
need for a surrogate); see also Skinner v. State of Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 
535, 538 (1942) (protecting the right to procreate via the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause). 
 87. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 537 (holding it unconstitutional to strip someone of their 
fundamental right to procreate). 
 88. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (requiring states to provide equal protection 
under the law for all people). 
 89. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (holding procreation to be a fundamental right). 
 90. See id. (incorporating the right to procreate under the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 91. See id. (acknowledging the far-reaching effects that denying the right to 
procreate has on a race or group of people). 
 92. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15 (2)(a)-(c) (West 1993) (limiting valid surrogacy 
contracts to only women with a medical need); see also 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/20 
(a)(2)(2017) (limiting surrogacy contracts to people with a medical need, effectively 
barring healthy same-sex couples and single men from procreating). 
13
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of their children.93  The primary effect of these statutes is that they limit, or 
in many cases completely bar, LGBTQ+ people from having children by 
invalidating the contract formed between the intended parent(s) and the 
surrogate.94  This is an unconstitutional check on the procreation rights of the 
LGBTQ+ community because it affects them more acutely than it does any 
other group, thus violating the Fourteenth Amendment.95  The Fourteenth 
Amendment was incorporated under the Equal Protection Clause by the 
Supreme Court in Skinner to include the right to procreate; therefore, every 
person’s right to procreate must be equally protected under the law.96 
Florida’s statute uses gendered language that limits who can procreate via 
surrogacy.97  The statute unconstitutionally keeps people not in cisgender, 
hetero-presenting relationships from procreating.98  The statute’s deprivation 
of the LGBTQ+ community’s right to procreate as a minority group is similar 
to how people of color were strategically denied their procreational right in 
Skinner.99  The Supreme Court explicitly stated that the Oklahoma statute at 
bar in Skinner was problematic at its core because it granted the State broad 
power to grant certain individuals immunity from the practice, but then 
stripped others of their right to have children.100 
The Skinner Court expands further by looking to the future ramifications 
of routinely depriving a group of people of the right to procreate.101  
 
 93. See Courtney G. Joslin et al., Statutory Provisions Regarding the Permissibility 
and Enforceability of Surrogacy Agreements, LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND 
TRANSGENDER FAM. L. 236, 247 (Aug. 2019) (stating problems LGBTQ+ couples face 
when trying to have children, many of which are not immediately resolvable because 
case law is focused on hetero-presenting relationships). 
 94. See In re Gestational Agreement, 449 P.3d 69, 73 (Utah 2019) (holding that the 
gendered Utah surrogacy statute unconstitutionally barred the rights of the same-sex 
couple seeking to gain legal parentage of their child born from a surrogacy contract). 
 95. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (resolving that the right to procreate is a 
Constitutional right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause). 
 96. See id. (arguing that the right to procreate is a basic human right, and therefore 
is protected equally under the law). 
 97. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15 (2)(a)-(b) (West 1993) (limiting the right to 
procreate by not including all gender-identifying people in the statute). 
 98. See id. (implying that only cisgender women can participate in a surrogacy 
agreement by using the term “mother” in the statute). 
 99. See id. (mandating that the intended mother have a physician-documented 
medical need for a surrogate). 
 100. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (holding it unconstitutional to deprive a person of 
the basic liberty of procreation). 
 101. See id. (arguing that depriving a group of the right to procreate can cause that 
group to disappear entirely). 
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Depriving a group of this right causes irreparable injury to minority groups 
because it allows a dominant majority to regulate who in the minority is 
allowed to procreate, potentially limiting the number of minority births.102  
As a minority group, LGBTQ+ people are just as at risk of injury today at 
the hands of the cisgender, hetero-presenting majority.103  The Court requires 
statutes infringing on the right to procreate to undergo strict scrutiny because 
of lasting, potentially devastating future effects on the LGBTQ+ 
community.104  Strict scrutiny is required for any law that may infringe upon 
a fundamental interest, but the Florida statute is neither narrowly tailored, 
nor backed by a compelling government interest.105  The statute affects all 
people seeking to have children through a surrogacy contract and does not 
take steps to protect surrogates–the party the state has an interest in 
protecting.106 
The Florida statute unconstitutionally limits members of the LGBTQ+ 
community from exercising the right to procreate, a fundamental right as set 
out in Skinner, because it is not narrowly tailored.107  Despite the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, the statute broadly prevents this 
minority group from engaging a surrogate and having children.108  The 
statute effectively bars all non-cisgender, hetero-presenting members of the 
LGBTQ+ community from procreating by delegitimizing any efforts they 
make toward having children.109  There is no narrow-tailoring: all people 
 
 102. See id. (maintaining that the ramifications cause irreparable damage to 
minorities). 
 103. See LGBT Demographic Data Interactive, THE WILLIAMS INSTITUTE, UCLA 
School of Law (Jan. 2019), https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/visualization/lgbt-
stats/?topic=LGBT#density (showing that LGBTQ+ people make up only 4.5 percent of 
state populations on average). 
 104. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (invoking the Constitution’s guarantee of just and 
equal laws to require strict scrutiny for State sterilization laws). 
 105. See D.C. v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2851 (2008) (J. Breyer, dissenting) (outlining 
that strict scrutiny requires a statute to be narrowly tailored and support a compelling 
government interest and pointing out the deviation from the requirements in the majority 
holding). 
 106. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15 (1)-(2)(West 1993) (making no mention of 
avenues for LGBTQ+ people to enter legitimate surrogacy contracts). 
 107. See id. (providing no statutory exceptions or alternatives for LGBTQ+ persons 
to lawfully engage a surrogate); see also Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (stating that the 
Constitution provides equal protection under the law and State laws cannot unequally 
target minorities). 
 108. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15 (2)(a)-(b)(West 1993) (specifying that “mothers” 
have the medical need instead of using genderless terms or not requiring a medical need 
at all). 
 109. See In re Gestational Agreement, 449 P.3d 69, 73 (Utah 2019) (holding a Utah 
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without uteruses are uniformly barred from engaging a surrogate, whether 
single or in a same-sex relationship, because they are not cisgender women 
with a medical need.110 
Further, there is no reasonable government interest for the gendered 
medical restriction in the Florida statute.111  Those opposed to commercial 
surrogacy argue that a medical need requirement supports the state interest 
in protecting surrogates from exploitation.112  This argument falls flat in 
Florida because the legislature has not taken steps to institute viable 
protections for surrogates, although there is a model code to support such 
legislation.113 
Article 8 of the Uniform Parentage Act is a model for states’ surrogacy 
legislation, and still, Florida chose not to follow the map the Act lays out.114  
Florida does not include provisions in its surrogacy statute to directly protect 
surrogates during the course of an agreement, such as mandating legal aid, 
bodily autonomy for the surrogate, or the ability to terminate the contract at 
will.115  The statute instead focuses heavily on who is not allowed to be a 
party in a gestational surrogacy contract, showing the true intentions of the 
statute: to bar LGBTQ+ people from engaging a surrogate.116 
Florida’s statute is sloppy regarding the safety and welfare of surrogates 
when contrasted with the Uniform Parentage Act.117  The Florida statute 
 
statute unconstitutional for broadly stopping gay men from becoming the legal parents 
of their child born from a gestational surrogate). 
 110. See FLA. STAT. § 742.15 (2)(a)-(b) (1993) (using a gendered term for the medical 
need requirement in a way that bars same-sex couples, non-binary people, and male-
identifying people from legally engaging in a surrogacy contract). 
 111. See D.C. v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2851 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(requiring a narrowly-tailored provision and a compelling government interest for strict 
scrutiny of laws that limit fundamental rights). 
 112. See Wang, supra note 44, at A17 (explaining the negative response to 
commercial surrogacy legalization because of the commodification of women’s bodies). 
 113. See FLA. STAT. § 742.15 (1) (1993) (providing no protection for contracted 
surrogates beyond an age limit). 
 114. See Uniform Parentage Act, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, Art. 8 §§ 808(a)-(c) 
(2017) (creating a model statute dedicated to ethical and inclusive surrogacy 
contracting). 
 115. See FLA. STAT. § 742.151515 (1), (2)(a) (1993) (neglecting to statutorily require 
medical or legal payments for the surrogate or regulate contract termination). 
 116. See id. § (2)(a)-(c)(excluding people who are not a “commissioning mother” with 
a medical need and dividing them into three categories: (1) cannot physically gestate a 
pregnancy, (2) the gestation causes a health risk to the mother, or (3) causes a health risk 
to the fetus). 
 117. See Uniform Parentage Act, Art. 8 § 808(a) (requiring a surrogacy agreement 
allow surrogates to make independent health decisions, including terminating the 
16
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requires surrogates to be eighteen, but does not require contracts to include 
any protections for the surrogate’s health or wellbeing.118  The Uniform 
Parentage Act offers requirements that surrogates be twenty-one years old, 
complete medical and mental-health evaluations, and have independent legal 
representation in the contracting process.119  In comparison, the current 
version of the Florida statute provides a surrogate little to no legal protection 
if they enter into a contract, no matter if the intended parents have a medical 
need or not.120 
The Florida gestational surrogacy statute limits the right to procreate 
without meeting the strict scrutiny standards Skinner requires.121  The statute 
is not narrowly tailored and it bars an entire population from procreating 
without stipulating any reasonable limits on the law.122  Further, the Florida 
statute does not support a compelling government interest because it does 
not provide any substantial legislative protections for contracted 
surrogates.123  The absence of a compelling government interest and the 
failure to narrowly tailor the statute unconstitutionally interferes with the 
fundamental right to procreate.124 
2. The Illinois Statutory Requirement That a Person Must Have a 
Medical Need to Enter into a Valid Surrogacy Contract Is Unconstitutional 
Under Skinner Because It Bars a Group of People from Their Right to 
 
pregnancy). 
 118. See FLA. STAT. § 742.15(1) (1993) (requiring that a surrogate be eighteen before 
participating in a contract, with no mention of a medical exam, psychological exam, or 
legal aid). 
 119. See Uniform Parentage Act, Art. 8 § 808(a)-(c) (requiring surrogates and 
intended parents to be twenty-one years old, to complete medical and mental-health 
evaluations, and have independent legal representation). 
 120. See FLA. STAT. § 742.15 (1)-(4) (1993) (overlooking the need for contracted legal 
protections for surrogates). 
 121. See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 540-41 (1942) 
(subjecting statutes regarding the fundamental right of procreation to strict scrutiny); see 
also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15 (1)-(2)(b) (1993) (limiting surrogacy contracts to 
“mothers” with a medical need with no measure to include LGBTQ+ people). 
 122. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 540 (mandating that laws limiting the right to 
procreation must undergo strict scrutiny). 
 123. See Uniform Parentage Act, Art. 8 § 808(a)-(c) (requiring surrogacy agreements 
to protect surrogates’ rights and interests); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15(1) (West 
1993) (requiring only that a person be at least eighteen years old to become a surrogate). 
 124. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 535, 538 (designating procreation a fundamental right 
protected by the Equal Protection Clause). 
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Procreate Despite Its Non-Gendered Language. 
The Illinois surrogacy statute unconstitutionally limits LGBTQ+ people 
from procreating, against the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, because it requires a medical need in order to engage in a 
surrogacy contract without providing an alternative for healthy LGBTQ+ 
individuals or couples.125  As the Court states in Skinner, statutes limiting the 
right to procreate, such as the Illinois surrogacy statute, cause irreparable 
injury to the people they affect.126  These statutes can cause the groups they 
affect to “[w]ither and disappear.”127  Skinner acknowledged the high risk of 
minority populations devastated by a statute the white majority created that 
was focused on sterilizing the imprisoned.128  That risk also rings true for the 
LGBTQ+ community today, who are affected by statutes created in 
predominantly cisgender, hetero-presenting legislatures.129  These statutes 
have dramatic and irreversible impacts on the LGBTQ+ community when 
they mitigate a person’s ability to have children or claim children as their 
own.130 
When applied, the medical need requirement in the Illinois statute severely 
limits the right to procreate for members of the LGBTQ+ community 
because healthy people in same-sex couples do not meet the requirement and 
may not be able to procreate without the help of a surrogate.131  The Illinois 
statute utilizes gender-neutral pronouns that makes the statute seem, on its 
face, inclusive.132  Yet, the statute limits the right to procreate to cisgender, 
hetero-presenting couples because it requires that there be a medical need in 
 
 125. See id. (explaining that, as a basic right, the right to procreate cannot be limited 
by state law in a way that disproportionately affects a minority group). 
 126. See id. at 541 (stating that in reckless hands, the ability to deny the right to 
procreate causes damage to groups of people). 
 127. See id. (referring to the power dynamic between the majority white community 
and minority communities of color). 
 128. See id. (stating that “[i]n evil or reckless hands it can cause races or types which 
are inimical to the dominant group to wither and disappear”). 
 129. See In re Gestational Agreement, 449 P.3d 69, (Utah, Aug. 1, 2019) 
(acknowledging that the medical requirement prevented LGBTQ+ people from engaging 
a surrogate). 
 130. See id. at 84 (holding that barring same-sex couples from claiming legal 
parentage was against the Equal Protection Clause); see also Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 
2075, 2080 (2017) (holding that barring the mother’s same-sex spouse from being listed 
on the birth certificate violated the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 131. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/20 (2017) (limiting procreation for LGBTQ+ 
people by instituting a medical need requirement). 
 132. See id. (using the pronouns “he, she, or they” to refer to intended parents). 
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order to legally engage a surrogate.133  The Illinois statute does not expressly 
define a medical need, instead deferring to medical practitioners to decide 
whether a medical need exists.134  Without a definition of medical need, the 
limits of the statute are ambiguous and make the right to procreate, at best, 
uncertain for LGBTQ+ people.135 
As it is worded now, the Illinois statute bars healthy men, same-sex 
couples, and other queer couples from engaging in a surrogacy contract.136  
The statute obstructs an LGBTQ+ person’s right to procreate in a way that 
leaves the same right of the cisgender, hetero-presenting majority 
unscathed.137  When the statute was passed in 2005, it restricted the right to 
procreate via surrogate in such a way that only cisgender, hetero-presenting 
couples would be able to take advantage of the medical technology.138  The 
statute’s medical need requirement makes it virtually impossible for male 
members of the LGBTQ+ community to engage a surrogate for their own 
procreative needs because it is unlikely a medical professional would deem 
it medically necessary.139  The Illinois legislature has not fixed the statute to 
remove the medical need requirement, although it amended various other 
sections of the Parentage Act between 2005 and today, despite the obvious 
drawbacks.140  Currently, the statute violates the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment because it unequally affects a specific group of 
people.141 
 
 133. See id. (requiring persons wanting to commercially contract for a surrogate to 
have a medical need, regardless of their gender). 
 134. See id. (requiring a physician’s affidavit to confirm the medical need in addition 
to a mental health evaluation). 
 135. See Ford, supra note 58, at 245 (recognizing the unlikelihood that medical 
practitioners would acknowledge having male genitalia as a legitimate medical need for 
a surrogate). 
 136. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/20 (2017) (restricting valid surrogacy contracts to 
those with a confirmed medical need). 
 137. See id. (limiting surrogacy contracts to people with a uterus). 
 138. See Ford, supra note 58, at 245 (2005) (noting that the newly-passed Surrogacy 
Act would likely not allow men, whether hetero-presenting or gay, and no matter if they 
are single or in a couple, to procreate via surrogacy in Illinois). 
 139. See id. (stating that there is a great challenge for a same-sex couple to have 
children via surrogate in Illinois and have joint parental rights under the curtain phrasing 
of the statute because of the medical need requirement); see also 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
47/20 (2017) (requiring a physician to confirm a medical need for a surrogate). 
 140. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/20 (2017) (showing no substantive adjustments to 
the medical need requirement since its inception in 2005). 
 141. See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) 
(explaining that states cannot unequally legislate away the right to procreate). 
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The right to procreate is guaranteed to all people through the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.142  Under Skinner, the 
Illinois statute must be narrowly tailored and further a compelling 
government interest in order to meet the strict scrutiny standard.143  The 
Illinois statute is not narrowly tailored because it unequally affects a broad 
class of people.144  The statute serves as a barrier to any person who is not 
cisgender and hetero-presenting and their right to have children.145  Although 
the gender-neutral language of the statute seems inclusive, the medical 
requirement still effectively bars many members of the LGBTQ+ community 
from procreating because, as healthy people not in a cisgender, hetero-
presenting relationship, they do not have a medical need for a surrogate.146 
Further, the Illinois statute is not advancing a compelling government 
interest.147  The medical requirement in the Illinois statute serves no 
legitimate purpose, as it does not protect surrogates and does not protect the 
intended parents.148  The Illinois statute lists requirements that do serve a 
legitimate purpose, such as psychological evaluations for the surrogate and 
the intended parents, health insurance for the surrogate, and independent 
legal counsel for both parties.149  These stipulations provide logical supports 
for both parties to insure a successful surrogacy agreement, unlike a medical 
requirement.150  The medical requirement does not protect the surrogate 
because its only purpose is to prevent people who want to have children from 
 
 142. See id. (holding the Oklahoma legislation unconstitutional on the grounds that 
procreation is fundamental for the survival of humanity). 
 143. See id. (explaining that State statutes regarding sterilization require strict scrutiny 
because the laws can invidiously affect some groups of people). 
 144. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/2020 (2017) (mandating a medical need to engage 
in a legitimate surrogacy contract but failing to define what a “medical need” is). 
 145. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (arguing that a statute cannot essentially bar a 
minority from procreating because there is no opportunity for a person to regain what the 
law takes from them through other means). 
 146. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/2020 (2017) (requiring a medical need for a 
legitimate surrogacy contract, effectively cutting off the possibility for members of the 
LGBTQ+ community to procreate). 
 147. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (requiring strict scrutiny for statutes that limit the 
right to procreate). 
 148. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/2020 (2017) (listing requirements that protect the 
interests of the surrogate and the intended parents outside of the medical requirement). 
 149. See id. (requiring protections for the surrogate and the intended parents for a 
legal surrogacy contract). 
 150. See id. (creating a legitimate support system for both parties by requiring health 
insurance for the surrogate and legal counsel for both parties). 
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engaging in commercial surrogacy.151 
Statutes with a provision requiring a medical need in order to engage in a 
valid commercial surrogacy contract strips same-sex couples and other 
members of the LGBTQ+ community of their right to procreate, regardless 
of whether the statute contains gender-neutral language.152  Statutorily 
requiring a medical need keeps physically and mentally healthy LGBTQ+ 
couples (two cisgender men, for example) from procreating because a doctor 
could decide there is not a legitimate medical need for a surrogate.153  Barring 
a person from having children is not reversible and, as noted in Skinner, the 
effects of such a law last for generations.154  Like the Oklahoma statute in 
Skinner, the Illinois statute blocks people from having children and causes 
them to suffer irreparable damage by limiting their ability to fulfill their 
desire to have children.155 
B. Medical Need Requirements Are Unconstitutional Under Obergefell 
Because They Deprive Same-Sex Couples of the Right to Participate 
Equally in Marital Benefits. 
Procreation and childrearing are among the many protected benefits 
included in the right to marry that the Supreme Court held to be protected 
for all people, regardless of sexual orientation or gender identity.156  Supreme 
Court decisions over the last several decades confirm that the Constitution 
allows people the right to make decisions for themselves in their homes and 
relationships without government interference.157  Gestational surrogacy 
 
 151. See Uniform Parentage Act, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, Art. 8 § 808(a)-(c) 
(providing protection for surrogates without limiting who has the right to procreate via 
surrogate). 
 152. See FLA. STAT. § 742.15 (1993) (barring men from engaging in a valid surrogacy 
contract because they are not the intended mother with a medical need); see also 750 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 47/20 (2017) (barring people from engaging in a valid surrogacy contract 
because they do not medically need a surrogate). 
 153. See Ford, supra note 58, at 245 (noting that no state included a potential father’s 
inability to become pregnant in the definition of a medical need for a surrogate). 
 154. See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (stating that the 
statute in question causes irreparable injury that deprives those affected of a basic 
liberty). 
 155. See id. (holding that depriving people of a basic liberty is unconstitutional under 
the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 156. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 U.S. 2584, 2590 (2015) (holding that states cannot 
bar LGBTQ+ people from the right to marry because it is protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
 157. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (combining aspects of 
the First, Third, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments to create a penumbral right to privacy); 
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statutes with medical requirements, like the Florida and Illinois statutes, 
interfere with people’s privacy and childbearing rights because they prevent 
LGBTQ+ couples from legally engaging a surrogate.158 
Gendered gestational requirements, like the Florida statute, deprive 
LGBTQ+ people of their rights to procreate and privacy, and are therefore 
unconstitutional under Obergefell.159  Non-gendered gestational medical 
requirements, like the Illinois statute, still set conditions on the benefits of 
marriage that disparately affect LGBTQ+ people.160  Across the board, 
medical requirements unequally rob a group of people of their right to 
procreate and the other benefits included in the right to marry, and are thus 
unconstitutional.161 
1. The Gendered Florida Statutory Requirement That a Person Must 
Have a Medical Need to Enter into a Valid Surrogacy Contract Is 
Unconstitutional Under Obergefell Because It Bars LGBTQ+ Couples 
from the Benefits of Marriage. 
Florida’s gendered medical requirement unconstitutionally bars LGBTQ+ 
persons from the benefits of marriage because it does not restrict cisgender, 
hetero-presenting persons in the same way.162  This differential treatment 
was held unconstitutional in Obergefell, whose holding was reaffirmed in 
Pavan.163  Further, it denies LGBTQ+ couples the marital rights established 
in Supreme Court precedent regarding marriage and family.164  The right to 
 
see also Carey v. Population Servs., Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 683-85 (1977) (protecting the 
right to make autonomous childbearing choices). 
 158. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15 (West 1993) (requiring a doctor to examine the 
intended mother and decide whether she has a medical need); see also 750 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 47/20 (2017) (requiring a doctor’s exam to determine if a person can engage a 
surrogate). 
 159. See In re Gestational Agreement, 449 P.3d 69, 74 (Utah 2019). (stating that state 
laws that deny LGBTQ+ people the marital benefits given to cisgender couples are 
unconstitutional under Obergefell). 
 160. See id. at 74, 78 (recognizing that it is impossible to read gendered language in 
a statute as gender-neutral). 
 161. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 U.S. 2584, 2590 (2015) (recognizing that the right 
to marriage includes numerous other benefits that cisgender, hetero-presenting people 
enjoy). 
 162. See Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2078 (2017) (applying Obergefell to the 
gendered Arkansas statute in question). 
 163. See id. (affirming Obergefell and holding statutes which deny same-sex couples 
the liberties afforded to cisgender couples to be unconstitutional). 
 164. See Obergefell, 135 U.S. at 2599 (stating Supreme Court precedents for 
individual autonomy in contraception, procreation, and childrearing). 
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privacy in marital affairs and the right to make independent decisions on 
childbearing are included in the list of fundamental marital rights.165  These 
rights, given to cisgender, hetero-presenting couples without unconquerable 
restrictions, cannot be taken from LGBTQ+ people without contravening the 
Constitution.166 
The Florida gestational surrogacy statute is clearly unconstitutional under 
Obergefell because its gendered medical need requirement restricts 
LGBTQ+ persons far more severely than cisgender, hetero-presenting 
persons.167  While the statute harshly limits a female-identifying individual’s 
ability to engage a surrogate, it completely eradicates a male-identifying 
individual’s ability to engage a surrogate.168  Through this statute, Florida 
has relegated the LGBTQ+ community to a lower-class life that cisgender 
heterosexual people would find unendurable: married but without complete 
control over their own childbearing decisions.169 
Florida’s statute unconstitutionally strips half of the LGBTQ+ population 
of its ability to have children by not using inclusive terminology and not 
creating an avenue for LGBTQ+ people to engage a surrogate.170  It also 
unconstitutionally denies same-sex couples the benefits afforded to 
cisgender, hetero-presenting couples by the state against the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Pavan.171 
2. The Gender-Neutral Illinois Statutory Requirement That a Person 
 
 165. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 490 (1965) (forbidding overly broad 
government regulations within the zone of privacy of a marriage); see also Carey v. 
Population Servs., Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 683-85 (1977) (acknowledging that the right to 
make childbearing decisions is at the heart of the penumbral right to privacy). 
 166. See In re Gestational Agreement, 449 P.3d 69, 74 (Utah 2019) (noting that men 
in a same-sex marriage could not meet the Utah surrogacy requirement for the “mother’s” 
medical need). 
 167. See Obergefell, 135 U.S. at 2590 (holding state statutes that treat LGBTQ+ 
persons differently than cisgender persons to be unconstitutional); see also FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 742.15 (West 1993) (limiting valid surrogacy contracts to “mothers” with a 
medical need). 
 168. See In re Gestational Agreement, 449 P.3d at 74 (holding the gendered Utah 
surrogacy statute unconstitutional because it barred the petitioners, a same-sex male-
identifying couple, from becoming the legal parents of their child). 
 169. See Obergefell, 135 U.S. at 2601 (acknowledging the imbalance between 
LGBTQ+ people and cisgender people in the ability to live one’s life the way they wish). 
 170. See Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2078-79 (2017) (holding an Arkansas 
requirement that only a male spouse can be on a birth certificate unconstitutional because 
it treated same-sex couples differently than cisgender couples). 
 171. See id. (referring to the “constellation of benefits” bestowed on cisgender couples 
by the state that cannot be unconstitutionally denied to LGBTQ+ people). 
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Must Have a Medical Need to Enter into a Valid Surrogacy Contract Is 
Unconstitutional Under Obergefell Because It Bars LGBTQ+ Couples 
from the Benefits of Marriage. 
Like the Florida statute, the Illinois surrogacy statute requiring intended 
parents to have a medical need unconstitutionally places an unequal burden 
on the shoulders of LGBTQ+ people without due process of law.172  Unlike 
the Florida statute, the Illinois statute is gender-neutral and seems to be 
inclusive on its face.173  Nonetheless, the medical requirement bars many 
LGBTQ+ couples from procreation entirely without due process of law, 
while cisgender, hetero-normative couples have access to alternative 
avenues for overcoming procreation hurdles.174  As such, the statute is 
unconstitutional under Obergefell, which holds that infringement of marital 
rights based on sexual orientation is a violation of the Due Process Clause 
and the Equal Protection Clause under the Fourteenth Amendment.175 
Obergefell holds that choices concerning contraception, procreation, and 
childrearing fall under the right to marry, and are thus individual and 
fundamental rights protected by the Constitution.176  The exclusion of same-
sex couples – and thereby LGBTQ+ people generally – from marriage and 
the rights included in that marriage is unconstitutional.177  The gender-neutral 
Illinois statute still restricts same-sex couples’ procreation choices in a way 
that many hetero-presenting couples would find intolerable.178  A statute that 
unequally restricts the fundamental rights of a specific group of people, like 
the Illinois statute does, is unconstitutional under Obergefell.179 
 
 172. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15 (West 1993) (limiting the ability of male-
identifying people to legally engage a surrogate); see also 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/20 
(2017) (using gender-neutral terms to restrict the ability of LGBTQ+ people to engage a 
surrogate). 
 173. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/20 (2017) (using the gender-neutral terms “he, she, 
or they” to describe the surrogacy statute’s medical need requirement). 
 174. See Obergefell, 135 U.S. at 2601-02 (acknowledging that it is a violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause to limit LGBTQ+ people’s marital rights when they are not 
limited for others). 
 175. See id. at 2602 (holding it unconstitutional to create hurdles for LGBTQ+ people 
that cisgender people do not face). 
 176. See id. at 2599 (placing the fundamental rights concerning individual intimate 
choices named in prior cases under the umbrella of marital benefits). 
 177. See id. at 2604 (analyzing the protections of the right to marry and concluding 
that same-sex couples are also protected by the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 178. See id. at 2601 (noting that same-sex couples are forced to have unstable and 
uncertain personal lives when their constitutional rights to marry, procreate, and raise 
children are not protected). 
 179. See id. (holding that state laws cannot limit LGBTQ+ marriages when 
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For example, even if same-sex couples are able to become parties to a 
valid surrogacy contract, they still might not be able to list both parents as 
the legal guardians of the child.180  As held in Pavan, it is unconstitutional to 
limit the marital rights of LGBTQ+ people in a way that cisgender, hetero-
identifying people are not.181  LGBTQ+ parents in Illinois may have to go 
through risky adoption proceedings with a traditional surrogate to ensure 
both parents are legal guardians of their child.182  Unlike hetero-presenting 
couples, same-sex couples in Illinois cannot be certain of whether they have 
access to the rights the Constitution prescribes.183  This difference between 
the lives of same-sex couples and hetero-presenting couples is 
unconstitutional because, as stated in Obergefell, the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment  guarantees the right to procreate, 
regardless of sexual orientation.184 
The Illinois statute also restricts LGBTQ+ procreation rights in violation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause by denying LGBTQ+ 
people their liberty in making autonomous choices in marriage.185  In relation 
to marital rights and the benefits included in that right, the Due Process 
Clause and the Equal Protection Clause are bound together; if one is 
infringed upon, the other is as well.186  Illinois restricts the right of LGBTQ+ 
people to procreate if it creates barriers to engage a surrogate without due 
process of law, but does not impose the same barriers as the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to cisgender, hetero-presenting people 
in the same degree.187  As such, the Illinois statute is unconstitutional because 
it infringes on the marital and procreative rights of LGBTQ+ people against 
 
heteronormative marriages are not limited the same way). 
 180. See Ford, supra note 58, at 245 (recognizing that to get both partners in a gay 
relationship listed as a father, they would need to assume the risk for adoption in a 
traditional surrogacy agreement). 
 181. See Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2078 (2017) (holding that being a “parent” 
on a birth certificate is a marital benefit). 
 182. See Ford, supra note 58, at 245 (noting that a same-sex couple, of any gender, 
would have to go through adoption proceedings in order to share parental rights). 
 183. See Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2078 (holding Arkansas’s surrogacy requirement 
unconstitutional because it unfairly treated LGBTQ+ couples differently than cisgender 
couples in accordance with Obergefell). 
 184. See Obergefell, 135 U.S. at 2602 (holding that same-sex couples are guaranteed 
the right to marry as part of the liberty promised by the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 185. See id. at 2603 (expressing the interconnection between the liberty interests of 
the Due Process Clause and the equal rights interests of the Equal Protection Clause). 
 186. See id. (explaining that each clause is instructive of the other). 
 187. See Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2078 (affirming Obergefell by holding that statutes 
preventing LGBTQ+ people from enjoying marital benefits are unconstitutional). 
25
Grau: A Well-Rounded Argument: How Skinner and Obergefell make Medical
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2020
466 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW [Vol. 28:3 
 
the Fourteenth Amendment.188  
As written, the Illinois statute is unconstitutional because it unequally 
restricts the marital benefits of LGBTQ+ people in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and Equal Protection 
Clause.189  It does not comply with the Obergefell or Pavan holdings because 
it treats LGBTQ+ people differently than cisgender, hetero-presenting 
people.190 
III. POLICY RECOMMENDATION 
The best argument for legislation restricting surrogacy, or banning it 
entirely, is to protect surrogates from exploitation and the commodification 
of human bodies.191  This argument, typically made by cisgender, hetero-
presenting people, fails to recognize that it is possible to both protect 
surrogate interests and allow them bodily autonomy while also giving 
LGBTQ+ people the ability to legally have children.192 
Surrogates are certainly at risk for exploitation.193  While contracting 
parents tend to be older, wealthy, more highly educated, from larger cities, 
and more well-traveled, surrogates tend to be younger than the intended 
parents, poorer, from a small town or suburb, and typically have no higher 
education.194  The disparity between surrogates and intended parents 
immediately puts surrogates at a disadvantage.195  The ethical questions of 
 
 188. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (prohibiting states from infringing on the rights 
to due process and equal protection of the law). 
 189. See Obergefell, 135 U.S. at 2598 (acknowledging that the benefits and rights 
encompassed in the right to marriage are rooted in history and precedent). 
 190. See id. at 2599 (explaining that there is a right to autonomous choice regarding 
marriage and its benefits). 
 191. See Wang, supra note 44, at A17 (explaining the push-back against a New York 
bill which would legalize commercial surrogacy in the state). 
 192. See Alex Finkelstein et al., Surrogacy Law and Policy in the U.S.: A National 
Conversation Informed by Global Lawmaking, COLUM. L. SCH. SEXUALITY & GENDER 
L. CLINIC, 40 (2016) (noting that LGBTQ+ interests can be balanced with surrogate 
interests). 
 193. See Leslie Morgan Steiner, Who Becomes a Surrogate?, ATLANTIC (Nov. 25, 
2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2013/11/who-becomes-a-surrogate 
/281596/ (explaining that American surrogates tend to be younger and poorer than the 
intended parents). 
 194. See id. (specifying that American surrogates are 28 years old on average, tend to 
make less than $60,000 a year, and typically already have two or three biological 
children). 
 195. See Wang, supra note 44, at A17 (quoting Gloria Steinem who recently spoke 
out vehemently against the New York bill to legalize commercial surrogacy, alongside 
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surrogacy are debated globally, and because many countries ban surrogacy 
for domestic or foreign LGBTQ+ people, LTGBQ+ people look toward the 
United States to start their families.196 
Although there is risk for exploitation, those risks can be substantially 
mitigated by thoughtful legislation regulating the surrogacy industry.197  
Arguments for banning surrogacy do not recognize the risk for illegal 
surrogacy, which is certainly more likely to result in the exploitation and the 
creation of hazardous conditions for the surrogate.198  Instead, regulations 
can make sure surrogacy is conducted ethically and all parties are 
protected.199  The Uniform Parentage Act proposes regulations protecting the 
physical and mental health and safety of the surrogate.200  It states that 
surrogates must have independent legal counsel of their choice and that the 
agreement should provide the surrogate with the ability to make her own 
health and welfare decisions, including the decision to terminate the 
pregnancy.201 
Surrogates, just like people generally, have the right to bodily autonomy 
and to make their own decisions regarding procreation and childrearing.202  
While it is not the government’s job to tell people how to carry out their 
rights, it must provide protection to people’s fundamental rights guaranteed 
in the Constitution.203  The government should regulate surrogacy in order to 
 
prominent feminists). 
 196. See Tamar Lewin, Coming to U.S. for Baby, and Womb to Carry It, N.Y. TIMES, 
(July 6, 2014), at A1 (describing the influx of foreigners into the United States for the 
purpose of engaging in commercial surrogacy services). 
 197. See Uniform Parentage Act, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, Art. 8 § 804(a)(8) 
(2017) (providing states with a framework for regulating surrogacy to protect surrogates 
and intended parents from exploitation, such as requiring each party’s rights to be 
included in the agreement). 
 198. See Ian Johnson & Cao Li, China Experiences a Booming Underground Market 
in Surrogate Motherhood, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2014), at A4 (uncovering the Chinese 
surrogacy black market, where surrogates are sent to Thailand for embryo implantation 
then flown back to China to live in secrecy until the birth). 
 199. See Uniform Parentage Act, Profanatory Note, (laying out main goals to protect 
the interests of both the surrogate and the intended parents through well thought-out 
regulations). 
 200. See id. Art. 8, § 804(7) (providing requirements for the intended parents and the 
surrogate in order to engage in a legal surrogacy contract). 
 201. See id. (specifying that a legal surrogacy agreement must allow the surrogate to 
make autonomous decisions regarding the health and welfare of herself and the 
pregnancy). 
 202. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015) (restating the penumbra 
of rights included in the right to privacy, including bodily autonomy). 
 203. See id. (arguing that an ability, promise, and desire to procreate is not and has 
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protect surrogates’ right to bodily autonomy and to protect LGBTQ+ 
people’s right to procreate.204 
CONCLUSION 
Gender-specific statutes unconstitutionally limit the right to procreate for 
non-female identifying people and same-sex couples, whether the statute is 
gender-neutral or not.205  The Skinner holding demonstrates that both Florida 
and Illinois set unconstitutional statutory limits on LGBTQ+ people’s right 
to procreate.206  Obergefell reaffirms the right to procreate, including it as 
one of the numerous rights now under the right to marry umbrella.207 
As such, the Florida and Illinois statutes unconstitutionally limit the right 
to procreate which is guaranteed to all married couples no matter their gender 
identity or sexual orientation.208  Further, there is no reasonable government 
interest in a medical requirement for commercial surrogacy agreements.209  
As they are currently written, the Florida and Illinois statutes are 
unconstitutional and illegal.210 
In re Gestational Agreement, decided by the Supreme Court of Utah in 
August 2019, reaffirms the United States Supreme Court’s Obergefell 
rulings.211  The holding exemplifies the movement toward developing 
surrogacy precedent that is both constitutional and inclusive of all couples.212  
Along with other slowly updating state statutes, it also shows that the state 
 
not been a prerequisite for a valid marriage in any state). 
 204. See id. (acknowledging the Supreme Court precedent of protecting people’s right 
to make their own decisions regarding their health and wellbeing). 
 205. See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 540 (mandating the 
right to procreate); see also Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599 (ensuring the right to marry 
for all people regardless of sexual orientation). 
 206. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 540 (mandating that the right to procreate is fundamental 
and therefore requires strict scrutiny if regulated by the government). 
 207. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599 (mandating the right to marry as a fundamental 
right regardless of sexual orientation). 
 208. See id. at 2599 (arguing that the right to marry is fundamental because it includes 
other fundamental rights). 
 209. See D.C. v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2851 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(requiring that laws infringing on fundamental rights be narrowly tailored with a 
compelling government interest). 
 210. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599 (recognizing the right to procreate as protected 
under the right to marry). 
 211. See In re Gestational Agreement, 1449 P.3d 69, 82 (Utah 2019) (overturning the 
Utah surrogacy statute because it limited the right to procreate). 
 212. See id. (holding that LGBTQ+ couples have a constitutionally-protected right to 
procreate within the right to marry). 
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interest in guarding surrogates against exploitation can be protected with 
truly inclusive statutes.213 
 
 213. See generally VA. CODE ANN. § 20-162 (West 2019) (changing outdated 
language to be gender-inclusive, allowing unmarried couples to become parents, and 
permitting the use of donated embryos in surrogacy). 
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